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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), 
pursuant to an order of the Utah Supreme Court dated November 17, 
1992 which poured the case over to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Was the trial court correct in enforcing a settlement 
agreement between the parties that was unambiguous, contained all 
essential terms and was confirmed in writing by their respective 
counsel? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The decision of a trial court to summarily enforce a 
settlement agreement should not be reversed unless it is shown 
that there was an abuse of discretion. Zion's First National 
Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah App. 
1989.) This Court should affirm "if the record establishes a 
binding agreement and fthe excuse for nonperformance is 
comparatively unsubstantial.f" Id. 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES 
There are no statutes or rules that are dispositive of the 
issue before the Court.1 
1
 Appellants argue that §78-51-32 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended), and Rule 4-504(8) CJA support their position. As is 
shown in Point II, below, their position is incorrect. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
This breach of contract action was commenced on June 1, 1989 
by Plaintiff/Appellee John Deere Company. Thereafter, 
Defendants/Appellants2 filed an Answer and Counterclaim, and the 
parties engaged in substantial discovery. On September 21, 1992, 
the trial judge, upon cross-motions to enforce a settlement 
agreement, entered an Order granting John Deerefs motion, denied 
Appellants1 motion, found that the case was settled and declared 
that a mutual release prepared and submitted by John Deere was in 
full force and effect. That mutual release is a general release 
of all claims between the parties to this action. 
Appellants had moved the trial court to enforce a settlement 
involving a mutual general release between the parties to this 
action and to force an entity that is not involved in this case 
to relinquish a Judgment it had obtained through a settlement 
against some of these Appellants over two years earlier.3 The 
settlement the trial court enforced was memorialized in 
correspondence between the parties1 respective counsel in April 
1991. 
2Due to the number of Defendants/Appellants, rather than 
referring to each by name, they will simply be referred to as 
Appellants. 
3Appellants have never explained how the trial court was 
supposed to force a party that was not before it to release a 
judgment. 
-2-
Also on September 21, 1992, the trial court, pursuant to its 
Order enforcing the settlement, signed a Judgment dismissing this 
action with prejudice, (Copies of the trial court's Order and 
Judgment are attached hereto as Addendum A.) Defendants took 
this appeal from that Judgment on September 23, 1992. 
Statement of Facts. 
On June 1, 1989, a Judgment in the principal amount of 
$36,062.47 was entered against A & H Equipment, Inc., and Wendell 
Hansen, two of the four Appellants in the instant case, in favor 
of an entity entitled Farm Plan Corporation, which is not a party 
to this case. (R. 295-296.) (That Judgment is hereinafter 
referred to as the Farm Plan Judgment.) The Farm Plan Judgment 
was taken pursuant to a settlement wherein Farm Plan agreed to 
defer execution on the Judgment while the debtors paid terms on 
the Judgment amount. (R. 390.) 
On that same day the instant case was filed by John Deere 
Company claiming damages in the amount of $55,392.04 against 
A & H Equipment, Inc., Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson and Vada 
A. Anderson. (R. 105. )* 
On June 20, 1989, the Defendants answered the Complaint. On 
September 11, 1989, they filed a Counterclaim. (R. 137.) The 
Counterclaim never mentions the Farm Plan Corporation or its 
Judgment. (R. 137-131, 397.) Thereafter, the parties filed 
^Appellants incorrectly state that this action was commenced 
on May 1, 1989, rather than June 1, 1989. (R. 333.) 
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various pleadings and engaged in substantial discovery. None of 
those pleadings or discovery mention the Farm Plan Corporation or 
the Farm Plan Judgment.3 In fact, all of the agreements the 
Complaint is based upon are John Deere Company documents, such as 
the John Deere Company Agricultural Agreement and John Deere 
Dealer Guaranty. (See, e.g., Exhibits A-0 attached to Complaint; 
R. 1-105.) 
On April 10, 1991, counsel for Appellants, David Lambert, 
sent counsel for John Deere, Brent Stephens, a letter which 
contained a settlement proposal. (A copy of the letter is 
attached hereto as Addendum B.) That letter states, in pertinent 
part: 
Re: John Deere v. A & H Equipment, et al. 
Dear Brent: 
I have been asked by my client to propose a 
settlement in the above referenced case. The 
settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with 
prejudice and general release of claims with each party 
to bear their costs and fees. 
* * * 
Respectfully, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
\S\ 
D. David Lambert 
cc: A & H Equipment 
5Appellants argue that the claims in this action involved or 
included the claims in the Farm Plan litigation. (Brief of 
Appellants at 7.) inasmuch that the Farm Plan Judgment was the 
result of a negotiated settlement between those parties, those 
claims were part of an accord and satisfaction and could not 
have, legitimately, been part of this litigation. 
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On April 15, 1992, Mr. Stephens telephoned Mr. Lambert and 
accepted, without condition or qualification, the offer contained 
in Mr. Lambertfs April 10 letter. (R. 313-311.) 
On April 22, 1992, Mr. Stephens confirmed the acceptance of 
the offer in a letter to Mr. Lambert. (A copy of his letter is 
attached hereto as Addendum C.) (R. 309.) His letter reads: 
Re: John Deere v. A & H Equipment, et al. 
Dear David: 
This will confirm my telephone conversation of 
April 15, 1991, in which I accepted your settlement 
proposal contained in your letter of April 10, 1991. 
I will prepare the settlement documents and forward 
them to you for execution. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
\S\ 
R. Brent Stephens 
On or about May 8, 1991, Mr. Stephens sent an original of 
the Mutual Release of All Claims to Mr. Lambert and asked Mr. 
Lambert to provide John Deere with an executed release and the 
other settlement documents. (R. 307-304.) 
On or about May 20, 1991 Mr. Stephens forwarded Mr. Lambert 
another original of the Mutual Release of All Claims that had 
been duly executed by a John Deere representative. (R. 302.) 
On or about July 18, 1991, Mr. Stephens sent a brief letter 
to Mr. Lambert asking why, after two months, Mr. Lambert had not 
returned the settlement documents, and asked Mr. Lambert to 
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advise Mr. Stephens as to the status of those documents. (R. 
300.) 
Finally, on or about July 29, 1991, Mr. Lambert sent a 
letter to Mr. Stephens which attempted to add an additional party 
as an additional term to the settlement. (R. 298.) 
In his July 29, 1991 letter, Mr. Lambert asserted that 
Defendants now required that "John Deere Farm Plan" be added as a 
releasing party on the Mutual Release.6 Up to that point, 
neither Farm Plan nor its Judgment against certain of the 
Appellants had been discussed between Mr. Lambert and Mr. 
Stephens. In fact, Mr. Lambert admits that until after he 
submitted the settlement documents to his client he was 
specifically unaware of the Farm Plan Judgment. (R. 333, 395.) 
At all material times, Farm Plan and John Deere were 
separate and distinct corporations, although they shared the same 
parent corporation. They had separate management, kept separate 
records and had separate in-house counsel. (R. 390.) Although 
Farm Plan is affiliated with John Deere, it does not use John 
Deere in its name or its logo. (Id.) 
6It should be noted that there is no such entity as "John 
Deere Farm Plan" as set forth in Mr. Lambert's letter. 
Throughout their brief, Appellants erroneously refer to Farm Plan 
Corp. as "John Deere Farm Plan Corp." (See e.g., Brief of 
Appellant at 9, 17, 18, 31, 32.) This reference is misleading as 
there was no such entity involved in this case. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
enforced a clear settlement agreement between these parties. 
Appellants1 counsel made, in writing, a clear, unequivocal offer 
to John Deere which contained all essential terms and was within 
the authorization which he had been given by Appellants. The 
offer was clearly limited to the parties to this action. The 
offer was timely accepted by John Deerefs counsel, both verbally 
and in writing, and became a binding agreement between the 
parties. 
If Appellants really did not agree with the settlement, they 
could have alerted their counsel when they received a copy of his 
offer letter. Instead, they waited for several months to inform 
him and John Deere of the additional terms they purportedly 
expected to be part of the settlement. 
In Utah it is clear that settlements can be negotiated by 
counsel and that such agreements do not need to be in writing, 
unless otherwise required by the statute of frauds. Nor do 
settlements need to be entered on the minutes of the court in 
order to be valid, as is urged by Appellants. 
Appellants' claim of unilateral mistake is not supported by 
the record as the agreement is not unconscionable, Appellants 
were not diligent, and there was no mistake between counsel for 
the respective parties who had the authority to settle this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellants base this appeal on four points: (1) That the 
settlement enforced by the trial court was never proposed nor 
agreed to by the Defendants; (2) the settlement is not binding 
because the agreement was not filed with the court or entered 
upon the minutes of the court; (3) the agreement is void because 
of mistake; and (4) if an agreement existed it was ambiguous and 
the court erred in enforcing it. The evidence and law relied 
upon by Appellants does not support their position. 
POINT I 
THE UNAMBIGUOUS AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE 
LAWYERS FOR THE PARTIES WAS CORRECTLY 
ENFORCED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellants argue that the settlement offer contained in Mr. 
Lambert's letter of April 10, 1991, included a release of the 
Farm Plan Judgment or, alternatively, that there was never a 
meeting of the minds so the settlement was not enforceable. 
Appellants1 argument that the settlement proposal included a 
release of the Farm Plan Judgment is clearly unsubstantiated. 
Mr. Lambert's letter references only the instant case, does not 
mention any Farm Plan claim or Judgment, and specifically states 
that the settlement is between only these parties. In the 
subsequent telephone conversation between Mr. Stephens and Mr. 
Lambert, the Farm Plan case was not mentioned. (R. 312.) Mr. 
Lambert has sworn that he was not even aware of the Farm Plan 
Judgment until several months later. (R. 332-333.) Now, 
-8-
Appellants argue that Mr, Lambert's proposal included the Farm 
Plan Judgment. "When he [Mr. Lambert] proposed this settlement 
by means of this wording, Mr. Lambert's understanding was that a 
general release would release all outstanding matters between the 
parties, including all outstanding judgments." (Brief of 
Appellants at 8, emphasis and brackets added.)*7 The record does 
not support Appellants' claim that Mr. Lambert's settlement offer 
included the release of a Judgment that he did not know existed, 
by an entity that he had no knowledge of or involvement with and 
which was not even before the trial court. 
Appellants argue further that there was no meeting of the 
minds because Mr. Stephens's telephone call to Mr. Lambert and 
his subsequent confirming letter do not contain "specific terms." 
(Brief of Appellant at 8.) In both the telephone call and in his 
letter Mr. Stephens referred to and accepted the terms contained 
in the April 10, 1991 offer (R. 312); no additional specificity 
was needed. Mr. Lambert's letter contains all of the terms 
necessary to enforce the settlement between these parties. And 
Mr. Stephens clearly and effectively communicated his client's 
7Much of Appellants argument presupposes that John Deere and 
Farm Plan are one and the same. For example, in the passage 
preceding this footnote, Appellants argue that Mr. Lambert 
understood that the settlement would "release all outstanding 
matters between the parties." That is exactly what the trial 
court did: It enforced the general release between the parties 
in this case. Farm Plan is a separate entity which was not a 
party to this litigation, and it had no involvement is the 
negotiations and settlement in this case. 
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acceptance of the offer to Mr. Lambert. There can be no doubt 
that Mr. Lambert and Mr. Stephens, on behalf of their respective 
clients, had a meeting of the minds as is set forth in their 
April 1991 correspondence.0 
The record is also clear that Mr. Lambert had the authority 
to settle the case in this fashion. In his letter of April 10, 
1991 Mr. Lambert states that he was "asked by [his] client to 
propose a settlement in the above referenced case." This 
establishes that Mr. Lambert was authorized to settle the case 
for his clients. The scope of his authority may be inferred from 
his letter, but, regardless, there is no evidence in the record 
that Mr. Lambert abused or went beyond his authority. 
It is significant that Appellants have not submitted any 
evidence to suggest that Mr. Lambert was not authorized to settle 
the case in accordance with his letter of April 10, 1991, which 
was limited to the parties in this action. The only evidence in 
the record of Mr. Lambert's authority is his statement that his 
clients informed him that they would agree to dismiss their 
Counterclaim in this case in exchange for a complete resolution 
BAppellantsf argument, in large part, focuses on their 
perception that they, as opposed to their lawyer, never agreed to 
the settlement as enforced by the court. A lawyer can act for 
his or her clients, through principles of agency, and can reach 
settlement agreements on their behalf. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 
333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). 
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of "all John Deere matters". (R. 333.)9 That is exactly what he 
did. The record is conspicuously silent on the point now urged 
by Appellants that the Farm Plan Judgment was to be part of the 
settlement in this case. Mr. Lambert had not represented 
Appellants in the Farm Plan litigation and he was unaware of the 
Judgment in that case. It is unknown how Appellants believe that 
Mr. Lambert should have known about and included the Farm Plan 
Judgment in the settlement of this case when they had never 
informed him of that action and Judgment. 
Of the four groups involved in negotiating this settlement, 
Appellants were the only ones who had the opportunity to clarify 
the terms, if, in fact, they were not satisfied by the proposal 
contained in Mr. Lambert's offer. A copy of his offer letter of 
April 10, 1991, was sent to A & H Equipment. The letter clearly 
limits the offer to the parties in this case. If Appellants 
disagreed with Mr. Lambert's offer they had the opportunity to 
contact him and clarify their position before the offer was 
accepted by Mr. Stephens. This they failed to do and John Deere 
should not be penalized for Appellants' lack of diligence. 
9Appellants have misstated the record in this regard. They 
represent that Mr. Lambert was instructed to resolve all "John 
Deere-related matters," and they reference Mr. Lambert's 
affidavit for support. (Brief of Appellants at 8.) Mr. Lambert's 
affidavit is specific that he was instructed to resolve "all John 
Deere matters" which is much more limited in scope than a 
resolution of all John Deere related matters. Contrary to 
Appellant's assertion, there is no evidence that he was 
instructed to resolve all related matters, and their statement is 
misleading. 
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Appellants argue that the settlement documents Mr. Stephens 
sent to their counsel in early May "unilaterally provided terms 
limiting the proposed settlement agreement to a release of only 
those claims made in the present action." (Brief of Appellant at 
19.) The record is clear that that is exactly what occurred 
because that is what the parties had agreed upon. Mr. Lambert's 
letter of April 10 offered a settlement between the parties to 
the case referenced in his letter. Therefore, the only parties 
to the settlement documents would be John Deere Company on the 
one hand and A & H Equipment, Inc., Wendell Hansen, Mark B. 
Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson on the other. Appellants1 claim 
that Mr. Lambert's proposal included another unnamed party is 
unfounded. Mr. Stephens's settlement documents, in fact, 
effectuated a complete and general release between these parties 
as was agreed to by Mr. Stephens and Mr. Lambert in their 
conversations and correspondence in April. 
Appellants state that when Mr. Lambert received the 
settlement documents from Mr. Stephens, the language "was not the 
comprehensive and general release which Mr. Lambert had 
anticipated." (Brief of Appellant at 9.) Then, Mr. Lambert 
forwarded the documents to his clients who advised him of their 
rejection of the settlement and refused to sign the documents 
because the "John Deere Farm Plan Judgment" was not included in 
the release. (Id.) It was at this time that Mr. Lambert first 
learned of the Farm Plan Judgment. (Id.) 
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Appellants1 position is unfounded in several respects. 
First, if Mr. Lambert believed that the settlement documents he 
received from Mr. Stephens were not what he had agreed to, he 
would not have sent the documents to his clients for their 
approval. He would have immediately contacted Mr. Stephens to 
correct the error. And if the documents were not what Appellants 
were expecting, why did it take them over two months to inform 
Mr. Stephens that the proposed documents were not what they 
anticipated? The record suggests that Appellants simply had a 
change of heart and tried to improve their position after a 
binding settlement had been negotiated by their counsel. 
Appellants rely on the case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 
(Utah App. 1987) as support for their position. They claim that 
Brown is virtually indistinguishable from this case. (Brief of 
Appellants at 21.) Their reliance is misplaced. In Brown, the 
plaintiff moved for an order modifying her divorce decree for 
additional amounts of child support and alimony. On the day 
plaintiff was to be deposed, the parties met and stated a 
settlement on the record. The settlement reduced plaintiff's 
alimony and increased the child support. When the settlement was 
recited the defendant and both counsel made statements, but 
plaintiff remained silent. Thereafter, plaintiff refused to sign 
the settlement documents stating that they were unfair. 
Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement which was 
granted. Plaintiff opposed the motion by taking the position 
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that her counsel had changed his position on the day the 
settlement was read into the record and that her counsel had, in 
effect, acted contrary to her authority. Her stated reason for 
not speaking up when the settlement was recited was that she was 
in shock over her counsel's change in position. 
On appeal this Court reversed, finding that there had been 
no meeting of the minds. This Court found that plaintiff's 
silence could not be construed as assent to the agreement, 
therefore there could be no meeting of the minds, a requisite for 
a binding settlement agreement. In so holding the Court states: 
"For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties must 
be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record 
before a judge. 744 P.2d at 335.ao In Brown, it was necessary 
that the agreement be in writing to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, such is not the case here. Unlike Brown, there is no 
evidence in this case that Appellants did not assent to the 
agreement. Mr. Lambert's letter states he had been asked by his 
clients to settle the case, and the only evidence in the record 
is that Appellants agreed to settle the "John Deere matters." 
Appellants did not propose to make Farm Plan Corporation a party 
ao
 To the extent this language may be cited as support for 
the proposition that all settlement agreements must be in writing 
or stated on the record in open court, this Court has clarified 
that is not the law in Utah. Zion's First National Bank, v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478, 480, nt. 1, (Utah App. 
1989. ) 
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to the settlement until over two months after the settlement had 
been agreed to by counsel. There is much difference between this 
case and the Brown case. 
Again, the record in the instant case contains no evidence 
that Mr. Lambert was not authorized to offer the settlement 
proposal contained in his letter of April 10, 1991. At best, 
Appellants did not express their intentions to their counsel and 
were not diligent as the settlement was negotiated. As is 
affirmed by this Court in Zionfs First Nat. Bank v. Barbara 
Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah App. 1989): 
It is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract . . 
. . "The apparent mutual assent of the parties . . . 
must be gathered by the language employed by them, and 
the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding 
to the reasonable meaning of its words and acts." 
Here, the words of Mr. Lambert in his letter are clear and 
the acts of Appellants, for several months thereafter, are 
consistent with the settlement enforced by the trial court. 
Appellants1 contrary intentions, which were unexpressed to their 
counsel, do not affect the validity of the settlement. 
POINT II 
IN UTAH IT IS CLEAR THAT A SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO BE FILED WITH THE 
COURT OR ENTERED UPON THE MINUTES TO BE 
VALID. 
Even though Rule 4-504(8) CJA expressly states that such is 
not the case, Appellants, surprisingly, argue that all settlement 
agreements must be in writing to be enforceable. They refer to a 
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discussion in a dissent in the Barbara Jensen Interiors case for 
support and identify it as the "rule." (Brief of Appellant at 
29). Whatever confusion the black letter of Rule 4-504(8) may 
create, this Court's majority opinion in Barbara Jensen 
Interiors lays to rest the notion that all settlement agreements 
must be in writing to be enforceable. "It is a basic and 
longstanding principle of contract law that [settlement] 
agreements are enforceable even though there is neither a written 
memorialization of that agreement nor the signatures of the 
parties, unless specifically required by the statue of frauds.11 
781 P.2d at 480, nt. 1. Therefore, Appellants' position is 
without merit. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT APPELLANTS1 
CLAIM THAT THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
DUE TO UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal and should 
not be addressed by the Court. Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah 
County, 835 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah App. 1992). Even if it is 
appropriately before the Court, it is groundless because there is 
no evidence in the record to support the argument. Appellants 
set forth the appropriate elements which must be present in order 
to invalidate an agreement because of a unilateral mistake: 
(1) The mistake must be so grave as to render the agreement 
unconscionable; 
(2) The mistake must relate to a material feature of the 
agreement; 
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(3) The mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the 
ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake; and 
(4) It must be possible to return the parties to the status 
quo. 
(Brief of Appellants at 31, quoting B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young 
Sons Const. Co., 796 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1990).) 
However, in this case, there is no evidence that the 
settlement is unconscionable. Unconscionability occurs when 
contracts terms are so lopsided so as to oppress an innocent 
party or where there is an imbalance of the rights and 
responsibilities imposed by the contract, excessive price, or a 
significant cost-price disparity or terms that are inconsistent 
with accepted mores of commercial practice. Klas v. Van Wagoner, 
829 P.2d 135, 139, cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042, (Utah L p. 1992). 
Here, the parties simply agreed to dismiss their claims against 
each other and sign a mutual release. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that these terms are unconscionable. 
Appellants are naive to think that, even if the Farm Plan 
Judgment had anything to do with John Deere Company and could 
have been part of this settlement, that Farm Plan would release a 
valid judgment in exchange for a dismissal of speculative claims. 
Indeed, that would have been inconsistent with accepted mores of 
commercial practice. Appellants also claim that they "clearly" 
intended that the settlement would include a release of the Farm 
Plan Judgement. (Brief of Appellants at 31.) This intent is far 
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from clear. In fact, there is no evidence in the record to 
support this claim. The only evidence as set forth in Mr. 
Lambert's affidavit is that he was directed to settle the "John 
Deere matters." As we have shown, that is what he did. 
Second, there is no evidence in the record that there was a 
mistake. Appellants set forth a convoluted rendition of events 
from which they conclude there was a mistake. There was no 
mistake as to what matters were settled between Mr. Stephens and 
Mr. Lambert as is explained above. The correspondence between 
them could not be more clear. The fact that counsel for John 
Deere was aware of the Farm Plan Judgment does not prove that 
there was a unilateral mistake as is urged by Appellants, (Brief 
of Appellants at 32), it is simply immaterial. Farm Plan 
Corporation was not a party to this case and so what Mr. Stephens 
may have known about that entity makes no difference here. 
Third, Appellants cannot show that the claimed mistake 
occurred notwithstanding their ordinary diligence. Had they been 
diligent, the settlement would have never occurred, if, in fact, 
they did not agree with it at the time. When they received the 
copy of Mr. Lambert's settlement offer all they had to do was 
alert him that the terms were not acceptable or a mistake had 
been made and this matter would have been at an end. Instead, 
the Appellants allowed the settlement discussions to reach 
fruition and now they want this Court to unwind what was done 
several years ago. 
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The weakness of Appellants1 position on this point can be 
best summed up through their own words: "Plaintiff [John Deere] 
was well aware of the existence of the Farm Plan judgment, the 
underlying facts, and the fact that defendants probably intended 
to include this judgment in the settlement agreement," (Brief of 
Appellant at 34.) Appellants are not relying on evidence for 
their position; it is based upon mere speculation. 
Appellants1 unilateral mistake argument is without merit. 
POINT IV. 
THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
Appellants erroneously argue that the trial court somehow 
considered extrinsic evidence which means that the agreement was 
ambiguous. (Brief of Appellant at 35.) Appellants misperceive 
the court's ruling. Appellants argued, in the court below, that 
their settlement proposal included the Farm Plan Corporation, 
even though their offer letter references only this case and 
these parties. The judge's statement about the posture of the 
parties clearly refers to the fact that John Deere Company and 
Appellants were the only parties to this case and were the only 
parties the settlement offer referenced. The trial court was not 
referring to extrinsic evidence but was simply restating the fact 
the settlement was between the parties to this case—the posture 
of the parties referenced in Mr. Lambert's offer letter. 
Again, Appellants' own brief supports the trial court's 
decision to enforce the settlement. Appellants claim that Mr. 
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Lambert's offer contemplated two things: "The dismissal of the 
case and, conjunctively, an agreement for the release of all 
claims between these parties." (Brief of Appellant at 35, 
emphasis added.) That is exactly what the trial court 
accomplished in its Order. Contrary to their own argument, 
Appellants claim to have asked for a release of all claims 
between these parties and another entity which was not involved 
in this case. Appellants1 difficulty in explaining their 
position only underscores its fallacy. 
The agreement reached by Mr. Lambert and Mr. Stephens is 
clear and contains all essential terms. "A contract provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of the 'uncertain meanings of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.1" Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). Appellants do not, 
and cannot, show that the agreement was ambiguous in any fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, 
based upon the evidence before it, did not abuse its discretion 
in enforcing the settlement and, therefore, Appellee John Deere 
requests that the Judgment and Order of the trial court be 
affirmed. 
-20-
DATED th is 72lJ[ day of February, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: £ R'. firtent Stephen* 
Ryaji E. Tibbitts 
AttWneys for John Deere Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four (4) copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE, JOHN DEERE 
COMPANY, this 22nd day of February, 1992, to the following: 
D. DAVID LAMBERT 
LINDA J. BARCLAY 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
SNOW; 
By: 
IRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R. Btint Stephens 
Ryanli. Tibbitts 
Attorneys for John Deere Company 
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ADDENDUM A 
R. BRENT STEPHENS (A3098) 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiah County, SiaU U Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DEERE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL 
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and 
VADA A. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Civil NO. CV-89-1151 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
Based upon the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiff's Complaint and defendants' 
Counterclaim be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, and upon 
the merits, with each party to bear their own costs and 
attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
MULLEN Y.^CHRISTENSEN 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiah County, State u Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
^___ Q& Deputy 
R. BRENT STEPHENS (A3098) " " ~~ 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DEERE COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , O R D E R 
v s . 
A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL Civil No. CV-89-1151 
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
VADA A. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and 
defendants' cross-motion to enforce settlement agreement came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
on August 28, 1992, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
its counsel R. Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, and defendants were represented by their 
counsel D. David Lambert of the law firm of Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen. 
The Court reviewed the submissions and memoranda and 
affidavit submitted by the parties, and the Court heard oral 
argument. After being fully apprised, the Court hereby orders 
the following: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
hereby granted. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
hereby denied. 
3. This action is settled upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
a. A Stipulation, Motion and Judgment of 
Dismissal with prejudice as to the Complaint and 
Counterclaim will be signed by counsel and presented to 
the Court in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
b. The Mutual Release of All Claims attached 
hereto as Exhibit flBM is hereby declared in full force 
and effect as though executed by all of the defendants. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
D. David[L6mbdaet 
21 \RBS\ 1297 6.00<t\$ett1 orient. Orfd 
CULLEN Y. C^JISTENSEN 
District court Judge 
LIP 
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ADDENDUM B 
Jackson Howard 
S. Rex Lewis 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W, Slaugh 
Kevin J. Suttcrficld 
F. Richards Smith, HI 
Linda J. Barclay 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provot Utah 84603 
April 10, 1991 
Area Code 801 
Telephone 373-6345 
Telefax 377-4991 
P:A&HEQUDP.DDL 
Our File No. 19,456 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
Snow. Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: John Deere v. A & H Equipment, et al. 
Dear Brent: 
I have been asked by my client to propose a settlement with your client in the above 
referenced case. The settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and general 
release of claims with each party to bear their respective costs and fees. 
As you may know, the defendants have been involved in other litigation and have 
generally suffered serious financial reversals. I have evaluated the position of my clients and 
I believe that they have everything to gain by going forward with the litigation on the 
counterclaim and little or nothing to lose because they could not respond to a judgment if you 
were to obtain one. 
If this proposal is unacceptable, I need to immediately schedule a time to review your 
document production and dates for depositions. If I do not have your response by April 22*. 
1991, I will proceed with discovery scheduling. 
Respectfully, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & E 
D. Davia Lambert 
cc: A & H Equipment 
ADDENDUM C 
* S £ r r u P O C L M A N 
J ^ H O N O M. BERRY 
«. JAMES CLEGO 
3AV1DW SLAOLE 
K. DENNIS NORTON 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
JOHN E. GATES 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
KIM R. WILSON 
MICHAEL R. CARL3TON 
OAVIO G. WILLIAMS 
REXE.MAOSEN 
MAX D. WHEELER 
PAULJ.CRAT 
PAUL C OROZ 
MtCHACL 0. BLACKBURN 
ROBERT H. HENOERSON 
OAMIAN C SMITH 
STEPHEN J . HILL 
HENRY K. CMAI II 
BRYCE 0 . PANZER 
STANLEY K.STOLL 
OAVIO J . CASTLETON 
OAVIO W. SLAUGHTER 
STANLEY J PRESTON 
THOMAS M. ZARR 
JOYL.CLEOO 
R. SCOTT HOWELL 
SHAWN E. ORANEY 
JERRY a FENN 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
JOHN R. LUNO 
RYAN E. TiBBrrrs 
ANNESWENSEN 
ROONEY R. PARKER 
ANDREW M. MORSE 
RICHARO A. VAN WAGONER 
OAVIO W. STEFTENSEN 
ROBERT C KELLER 
EUZA8ETH KING 
DANIEL 0. HILL 
MARC T WANGS6AR0 
CAMILLE H. JOHNSON 
TERENCE U ROONEY 
THOMAS F. TAYLOR 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE. ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841A5-SOOO 
TELEPHONE teOli 321-dOOO 
F A C S I M I L E (SOI ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
THURMAN 4 SUTHERLAND I8B6 
THURMAN. SUTHERLAND* KING I8B8 
THURMAN. WEOGWOOO 4 IRVINE IOO0 
IRVINE, SKEEN 4 THURMAN 1923 
SKEEN. THURMAN. WORSLEY 4 SNOW IBS2 
WORBLEY. SNOW 4 CHRtSTENSEN 1967 
JOMN H. SNOW tair-teeo 
April 22, 1991 
OF COUNSEL 
MERUN R. LYBSERT 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
WRITER 5 DIRECT NUMBER: 
(801) 322-9131 
D. David Lambert, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: John Deere Company v . A & H Equipment, et ah 
Dear David: 
This will confirm my telephone conversation of April 15, 1991, in which I 
accepted your settlement proposal contained in your letter of April 10, 1991. I will 
prepare the settlement documents and forward them to you for execution. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R. Brent Stephens 
RBS:cn 
cc: Kim R. Wilson, Esq. 
21\RBS\l2976.004\Lanbert.ltr 
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